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Abstract:
In this paper we examine how stock returns in China respond to monetary policy announcements
made by PBC in a short term around announcement day. We employ a nonparametric event-study
method to investigate such reactions. We arrive at the following conclusions. Firstly, there is
information leakage of monetary policy changes, which is verified by significant changes in stock
returns before monetary policy announcement and quietness of stock market after announcement.
Secondly, financially constrained and financially unconstrained firms respond quite similarly to
monetary policy shocks, which disobeys credit channel of monetary policy transmission in the
short run. Thirdly, reserve ratio changes cause stronger responses than loan interest rate changes,
which demonstrate power of reserve ratio as a monetary policy instrument.
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1 Introduction
The driving factors and ultimate objectives of monetary policy are associated with un-
employment rate, output growth, and inflation rate. As it takes time for monetary policy to
change fundamentals of real economy, central bank governors need to be forward-looking
and make decisions in time to curb inflationary trend and help real economy out of potential
deflation. While nominal economic variables such as interest rate and asset prices are not
affected by monetary policy in the long term according to classic Keynesian theory, in the
short time, asset prices usually react promptly to monetary policy changes, which is inter-
preted as typical consequence of monetary policy adjustment by journalists and many prac-
titioners. It is important to understand links between ultimate objectives of monetary policy
and short-term responses of capital market, because this not only helps explain transmis-
sion mechanism of monetary policy, but also enables policy makers to adjust their actions
through monitoring market responses. For common investors, it is also quite necessary to
understand effects of monetary policy and forecast potential policy changes so that they can
reoptimize their portfolios.
Usually in the wake of long-standing boom in asset prices are bubble bursts, followed
by significant and persistent recession in real economy. This kind of scenario has been seen
for several times in the past two decades. After the global financial crisis, it is hotly debated
whether central banks should take asset prices into consideration when making monetary
policies, which has two implications for empirical research. Firstly, are central banks better
than market participants at judging market movements, and can market information helps in
making reasonable monetary policy? Secondly, how will asset prices react to these monetary
policies and can reasonable policies lead to a healthy financial market?
The principle objective of our research is to examine whether there is some significant
relationship between monetary policy and stock price movement in the short term around
announcement day. We may suspect that not all monetary policies will produce significant
impact on asset prices. Even the same policy change at different time can cause distinct
market responses, because these new policies influence asset prices not only through eco-
nomic channel but also through affecting market participants’ expectations that are adjusted
according to signals contained in new policies. Therefore, we investigate announcement
effects at an aggregate level, which means that we examine effects from expanding and
deflationary monetary policy announcements on the whole rather than investigate each an-
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nouncement one by one. It has been well documented in the literature (e.g. Bernanke and
Kuttner (2005)) that monetary policy adjustment causes market volatility not because of the
policy itself but because of unexpected shocks from policy changes. When contents of mon-
etary policies are anticipated by market participants, effects from policy changes may have
already been reflected in asset prices preceding announcement. Some evidence of informa-
tion leakage exists in the literature, which is more common at emerging market. Information
leakage does not refer to illegal or unethical leakage of monetary policy news here, and in-
stead it means that market participants infer potential policy actions from research on some
related news and economic data released by officials. The inference of monetary policy is
based on economic situation and common practice of PBC. PBC usually announces new
monetary policies during weekend or on vacation days. Taking two announcements of re-
serve requirement ratio changes in 2010 for instance, PBC raised reserve requirement ratio
by 0.5 percent respectively on 12nd February (before Chinese Spring Festival) and 2nd May
(before Labor Day). Such arrangement is to reduce market volatility on trading day right
after policy changes.
Various monetary policy instruments can also induce different consequences. For ex-
ample, regular open market operation by trading desk of central bank may only change
liquidity of money market for a very short period and have quite limited or no effect on
other asset prices. On the contrary, increasing reserve ratio can rein in excessive credit
creation from banks and may indicate signal of contractionary monetary policy path in the
future, and stock prices experience sharp declination after such announcement as a result.
Our research will study price movement before and after monetary policy announcements in
stock market. If there are some statistically significant responses in stock market, it shows
that expectations on policy actions have been formulated. If a new monetary policy is to-
tally unexpected, it may cause large shocks to stock market on the day of announcement
and takes several days for stock prices to absorb this information. By comparing impact of
announcement on reserve requirement ratio and loan interest rate, which are two most im-
portant monetary policy instruments for PBC, we can find some reasons why central banks
of developed economies abandon reserve requirement ratio as a policy tool while PBC used
it often in previous years.
Firms with various financial characteristics and in different industries may be affected
by monetary policy changes to different extents. In our paper, we will construct two kinds of
stock portfolios, which are financially constrained or unconstrained. By referring a company
to be financially constrained, we mean frictions that prevent the firm to invest in profitable
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projects. When a company with good growth opportunity can not fund desirable investments
with its own retained earning, it relies heavily on external financing. In emerging market like
China, loan from banks is the most important source of external financing. When reserve
ratio of saving banks and other financial institutions is increased, credit creation is tightened
and therefore less loans are available to those firms relying on external financing to finance
profitable investment. From the above discussion, we formulate a hypothesis that stock
prices of financially constrained firms will be more volatile to monetary policy changes than
financially unconstrained firms, which is aimed to test for the credit transmission channel of
monetary policies in the short term. If monetary policy works through credit channel, then
firms that are more constrained by credit will be more sensitive to policy changes and their
stocks in the period around policy announcement will also price this new information into
prices.
This paper takes monetary policies of the central bank of China (People’s Bank of China,
PBC) as research objective, and examines how policy announcements made by PBC affect
stock returns of all firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange. Reasons for this
research are based on the following aspects. Firstly, stock price is a main kind of asset prices
that are sensitive to policy changes, and stock market is the most important capital market in
China. Secondly, China is one of the most important emerging economy, and the interaction
between monetary policies and stock market in emerging market may be different from that
in mature market. Lastly but most importantly, in the past several years, PBC adjusted
monetary policies more frequently according to domestic and global economic situations.
This have been seen especially in 2007 and 2008, when China’s stock market reached peak
and then experienced drastic downturn. A detailed list of monetary policy changes is given
in the appendix. Relatively frequent monetary policy announcements provide us a natural
experimental design to study announcement events on stock returns.
The structure of this paper will be arranged as follows. Section 2 introduces related
literature, section 3 briefly introduces monetary policy practice in China and outlines re-
search methodology, section 4 explains research data and formulate financial constrained
portfolios, section 5 presents our empirical findings, and section 6 concludes.
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2 Related Literature
2.1 Selected literature on stock market return and monetary policy
The examination of monetary policy effects on stock market follows research on whether
monetary policy can affect interest rates in the literature. Cook and Hahn (1989) estimated
responses of interest rates to changes in the federal fund rate targets from September 1974
to September 1979. In 1970s, the Federal Reserve set a range over which fund rate can
vary in each month. Cook and Hahn regressed changes in interest rates on changes in the
midpoint of the target range on each resetting day of target rate, which is called event study
method in later research. Cook and Hahn found that short-term interest rate moves in the
same direction as federal fund rate changes. Thorbecke (1997) employed impulse-response
functions and variance decomposition from identified vector autoregression (VAR) to exam-
ine relationship between monetary policies and stock returns. Thorbecke found significant
relationship between monetary policy shocks and subsequent stock return variations.
As anticipated policy changes have little effect on stock prices, it is of vital importance
to isolate unexpected monetary policy shocks from expected changes contained in mone-
tary policy announcements. Both changes of midpoint of target range and innovations of
policy shocks from identified VAR are not persuasive. Kuttner (2001) provided a market-
based method to gauge monetary policy expectations by exploring information contained
in federal funds futures contract. Specifically, Kuttner extracted market expectation of tar-
get rate changes from differences in the future contract’s price between the day preceding
policy action and the action day. Gurkaynak et al. (2007) compared ability of a variety of
financial instruments to measure near-term expectation of federal fund rate, and they found
that federal fund futures contract dominates other financial instruments in predicting fu-
ture monetary policy path. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) used Kuttner’s method to isolate
expected and unexpected changes in fund rate target and regressed stock returns on inter-
est rate changes on days of scheduled meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee.
Rigobon and Sack (2003) found that short-term interest rate reacts significantly to returns of
broad equity indexes, so when we regress stock returns on changes of interest rate, we will
encounter endogeneity problem. Rigobon and Sack (2004) devised an estimator to over-
come this simultaneous regression problem, and show that event-study regression is only a
special case of their estimator.
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2.2 Implications from literature review
From the above review, there are several facts worth attention. Firstly, some researchers
just adopt simple event-study regression to capture the impact of monetary policy announce-
ments on stock returns. This method runs into the omitted variable problem, because there
may be some other factors besides changes in federal fund rate target influencing stock re-
turns. Gurkaynak et al. (n.d.) found that this kind of research needs two factors, which
are interpreted as ”current federal funds rate target” and ”future path of policy factor”. Sec-
ondly, endogeneity problem exists in event-study regression since central bank policymakers
may react to asset prices when shaping monetary policies. This evidence can be found in
Rigobon and Sack (2003). Lastly but most importantly, we can not find similar financial
market instrument as in Kuttner (2001) to gauge market expectations of PBC’s policy ac-
tions. Till now, there is no interest rate futures contract in China, and forward contracts of
interest rate in OTC market can not be used to measure policy expectations because they are
newly introduced and not traded actively at all.
We choose traditional event-study methodology in finance literature to examine how
events of monetary policy announcements by PBC affect returns of A-share stocks in China.
This method has the following three advantages. Firstly, it does not involve omitted variable
or endogeneity problem in model specification. Secondly, as the impact of monetary policy
announcements on stock market may be temporary, our event-study approach enables us to
examine responses on days around policy announcements flexibly. Thirdly, since market
expectations can be reflected in abnormal returns of stocks before announcements, we avoid
to measure expectations of monetary policies directly. Detailed introduction of event-study
approach will be presented in part 3.
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3 Research design and methodology
3.1 Monetary policy instruments in China
In order to study the impact of monetary policy announcements made by PBC on stock
returns in China, we need to have a brief view of the monetary policy instruments in China.
There are several monetary policy instruments applied by PBC, including reserve require-
ment ratio, central bank base rate, rediscounting, central bank lending and open market
operation. Among these instruments, daily open market operation is used most regularly by
trading desk of central bank to adjust liquidity of money market, which is aimed to make
market interest rate fluctuate slightly around interest rate target. Reserve requirement ratio
regulates the minimum reserves commercial banks should hold to customer deposits and
notes. The reserve ratio instrument is rarely used by central banks in developed countries,
because its adjustment will change money multiplier and cause drastic liquidity problems
for banks. However, this instrument has been employed frequently by PBC to rein in excess
liquidity to fight against inflation or inject liquidity to promote economy. The reserve ratio
was changed for 10 and 9 times by PBC respectively in 2007 and 2008. The central bank
base rates set lower bound for bank loans and upper bound for deposits. Although interest
rate marketization in China has been progressing gradually, PBC still plays a key role in
forming capital cost. Among all maturities of interest rates, the one-year loan interest rate
is adjusted most frequently to guide market interest rate. Compared with the above instru-
ments, rediscounting, central bank lending and interest rate of excessive reserves are rarely
used by PBC.
3.2 Research design and hypothesis
In this paper, we treat announcements of reserve ratio changes and new one-year loan
rate from year 2002 to 2010 as events, and examine how these two kinds of announcements
will affect A-share stock returns in China. The mechanism of reserve requirement ratio
was reformed in 1998, so in order to avoid structural changes resulted from this reform we
eliminate all announcements in 1998 and 1999. In 2000 and 2001, there were no announce-
ments on reserve ratio rate or loan interest rate. Therefore we only consider the two kinds
of announcements from 2002 to 2010, and a detailed list of these events can be found in
appendix. We choose A-share stocks rather than B-share stocks as research target, because
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they cover much larger samples and have more common investors involved so that they will
better reveal market responses to monetary policy announcements. In this part, we propose
the following hypothesis to be tested in our empirical part.
(1) Research on the credit channel of monetary policy transmission has been intrigued
by Bernanke and Blinder (1988). Bernanke and Blinder (1992) found that banks react to
reduced deposit, which can be caused by increased reserve ratio for example, firstly by sell-
ing off securities in the short term and then reducing loans in the longer run. Kashyap et
al. (1993) found evidence of loan-supply monetary-policy transmission. They showed that
firms switch to other external financing when available bank loans decline. Ehrmann and
Fratzscher (2004) found that individual stocks react heterogeneously to monetary policy
shocks, and firms that are financially constrained respond significantly more than uncon-
strained ones.
As changes in reserve ratio influence access to credit and variations in loan rate affect
capital cost of financing, firms that need bank loans to different extent may suffer or benefit
heterogeneously to monetary policy changes. We formulate two portfolios of stocks, which
are financially constrained or unconstrained, to investigate how stocks with different finan-
cial status react to monetary policies. By referring to financially constrained, we mean the
situation that firms with good growth opportunities rely heavily on external financing to fund
profitable investment. Here growth opportunity can be reflected by some financial variables
such as sales growth and net income margin (refer to Cleary (1999)). We use price-to-book
value (PTBV) to measure growth opportunity, because PTBV factors investors’ valuation
on potential growth opportunities in stock prices. If returns of financially constrained firms
suffer more from deflationary monetary policy than unconstrained firms in the short run, this
will support the credit transmission channel of monetary policy because participants expect
that financial constrained firms will be affected more severely by tightened bank credit in
the medium and long period.
(2) We divide all policy announcements into expanding and deflationary groups, and
examine their influences on stock returns on the whole. Expanding group includes all an-
nouncements of decreased reserve requirement ratio or loan interest rate, while deflationary
group refers to the case of decreased reserve requirement ratio or loan interest rate 1© . As
1© The ideal way to classify expanding and deflationary groups is to compare actual monetary policy actions
with market expectations on monetary policy. For instance, if market participants expect that central bank will
raise base loan interest rate with a large magnitude to curb high inflation, while the interest rate is increased
only by a moderate level, then this seeming contractionary policy is actually expansionary. However, we fail
to do this because we can not find a good measure of market expectation on monetary policy in China.
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monetary policies made under different economic conditions indicate distinct information
about central bank’s regulation path and even the same kind of announcement may induce
different responses of stock returns, examining announcements one by one will make our
conclusion less obvious. We expect that on days around announcements decreased reserve
ratio and loan interest rate boost abnormal returns of A-shares because of either more credit
available or lower capital cost, and vice versa. When information of new monetary policies
is leaked before announcement, A-share stocks react significantly and systematically prior
to announcement of monetary policies. When there is no information leakage and mone-
tary policy changes bring shocks to stock market, there will be systematic and significant
reaction in returns of A-share stocks after announcement. The hypothesis can be stated as
follows:
H1. leaked expanding monetary policies cause positive abnormal returns of A-share stocks
preceding policy announcements.
H2. leaked deflationary monetary policies cause negative abnormal returns of A-share
stocks preceding policy announcements.
H3. Expanding monetary policy shocks induce positive abnormal returns of A-share stocks
on days of announcement or after announcement days.
H4. Deflationary monetary policy shocks induce negative abnormal returns of A-share
stocks on days of announcement or after announcement days.
H1-H4 are a set of complementary hypothesis. There are several situations we can imag-
ine. For example, when a deflationary policy is announced after several expanding policy
releases, stock market may be shocked by this policy change, and reacts drastically on an-
nouncement day or even after announcement day. When the path of future monetary policy
is anticipated and only the extent of change is new for market participants, shocks caused
by policy changes are much less strong and stock market may stay comparatively calm on
announcement day. When a monetary policy is leaked before announcement, such news will
be reflected in stock returns before announcement.
(3) 28 of the 34 events we examined are announcements of deflationary monetary policy.
We study the impact of the 8 increased loan rates and 19 increased reserve ratios separately
to investigate how announcement effects of different monetary policy instrument differ 1© .
We also examine the effect of monetary policy announcements on property stocks on pur-
pose.
1© One announcement that contains both increased reserve ratio and increased loan rete is deleted.
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3.3 Event Study Methodology
We apply classic event-study methodology in finance literature to examine how stock
market react to monetary policy changes before and after announcement. The first trading
day after announcement is labeled as day 0. Our event window is from day -2 to day +2 so
that responses triggered by monetary policy changes are not contaminated by other policy
announcements 1© . The estimation window covers days from day -102 to day -3 2© . For each
announcement, there are many stocks simultaneously affected by the same shock, and we
treat each firm-announcement combination as an event.
Let Rit denote daily return of stock i on day t. Using the continuously compounding
method, we can calculate the return as follows,
Rit = lnPit − lnPi,t−1, where pit is adjusted price of stock i on day t. (3.1)
We use two regressions to capture abnormal returns Ait. The first method is market
model, which can be described as:
Rit = αi + βiRmt ,
Ait = Rit − (αˆi + βˆiRmt) , where Rmt is market return on day t
(3.2)
The second one is Fama-French three-factor model, described as:
Rit −Rft = βi1(Rmt −Rft) + βi2SMBt + βi3HMLt ,
Ait = Rit −Rft − βˆi1(Rmt −Rft)− βˆi2SMBt − βˆi3HMLt
(3.3)
In equation 3, Rf is risk-free return, Rm−Rf is market factor which is defined as returns on
all A-share stocks minus risk-free return and can be interpreted as risk premium of A-share
stock index, SMB denotes size factor which is return on small firms deducted by that on
large firms, and HML stands for book-to-market factor which is return on high book-to-
market stocks minus that on low book-to-market stocks and can be interpreted as relative
performance of value stocks to growth stocks. Abnormal returns are regression residuals
that can not be explained by risk factors in asset pricing models.
1© Although we can not distinguish responses caused by monetary policy news and other policy announce-
ments that are either domestic or international, we choose short event window to mitigate this problem because
this shortened window will include less influential announcements to overlap with monetary policy announce-
ment, and we assume that other policy announcements will not cause systematic error to our research design.
2© This length of estimation window enables us to estimate a stable relationship between stock returns and
pricing factors, and the window is not too long to include potential structural breaks in relationship between
stock returns and risk factors.
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There are two kinds of event-study test in the literature, cross-sectional test and nonpara-
metric test. Under the three assumptions that all events are independent, event has no impact
on variance of returns in event window and the abnormal returns are normally distributed,
Brown and Warner (1985) derived cross-sectional test statistic. Collins and Dent (1984)
relaxed assumptions by allowing for cross-sectional dependence in returns and possible in-
crease in return variances from estimation window to event window. Bernard (1987) and
other researchers relax assumptions of cross-sectional test further in other aspects. How-
ever, to the best knowledge of us, all these tests depend on certain assumptions and are not
robust in our research. As firms are influenced by the same announcements, their event win-
dow overlaps and therefore there is clustering problem. Besides, variance of returns may
be probably increased during event window with unknown pattern, therefore using variance
estimator in estimation window to substitute variance in event window is inappropriate.
Nonparametric event-study test is represented by rank test proposed by Corrado (1989)
and generalized sign test introduced by Cowan (1992). We use the latter one because gen-
eralized sign test allows for cross-sectional dependence and asymmetry of returns and out-
performs rank test when variance of returns increases in event window or stocks are thinly
traded.
The generalized sign test compares the number of stocks with positive or negative (cu-
mulative) abnormal returns in the event window to that in the estimation window. When
we test for the hypothesis that expanding monetary policy brings positive abnormal returns,
we define pˆ as the proportion of the number of positive abnormal returns over estimation
window applied to all firms and corresponding events,
pˆ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1
100
E100∑
t=E1
Sjt ,
where n is the number of events with announcements of expanding monetary policy and
Sjt =
1 if ARjt > 00 otherwise ,
When we test for the hypothesis that deflationary monetary policy induces negative abnor-
mal returns, pˆ stands for the proportion of the number of negative abnormal returns applied
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to all firms and events with announcement of deflationary monetary policy, and
Sjt =
1 if ARjt < 00 otherwise ,
Define w as the number of stocks in event window for which the abnormal return is positive
or negative, generalized sign test can be written as
ZG =
w − npˆ√
npˆ(1− pˆ) , (3.4)
which has an asymptotic standard-normal distribution. We employ one-tail normality test
of generalized sign test statistic in remaining part. For both expanding and deflationary
monetary policies, if the number of positive or negative abnormal returns in event window
is significantly larger than the counterpart in estimation window, ZG is expected to be larger
than critical value of standard normal distribution with 95% or 99% confidence level.
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4 Financially Constrained Portfolio
4.1 Method to construct financially constrained portfolio
In this research, we pick out all A-share stocks listed at Shanghai or Shenzhen exchange
and keep only those firms that are either financially constrained or unconstrained. We iden-
tify firms that have good growth opportunities and rely heavily on external financing as
financially constrained ones, and that do not finance profitable investment or have enough
internal fund as financially unconstrained ones. There are four major methods in the liter-
ature to categorize firms into financially constrained or unconstrained groups. Kaplan and
Zingales (1997) extracted financial status of 49 firms from their financial reports year by
year, and regressed financial status on a set of financial variables using ordered logit model
to provide an overall measure of financial constraint. The disadvantage of their method is
that it is not manageable to include large research sample because it is too time-consuming
to identify financial status through reading financial reports year by year and firm by firm.
Whited and Wu (2006) built an intertemporal investment model under certain assumptions,
and estimated this model by GMM method to construct a financial constraint index. Cleary
(1999) classified firms into groups according to whether they increased or decreased divi-
dends in the past year, and used linear discriminant analysis to construct financial constraint
index. This method is not applicable in our research, because underlying assumptions of dis-
criminant analysis are not satisfied. Some other empirical researches just categorize firms
according to rank of certain financial variables, such as firm size, dividend ratio, Tobin’s Q
and so on.
We use a simple scheme to provide a measure of financial status to each firm year by
year. Our method is implemented in the following steps:
(1) We specify a binary variable to indicate whether a firm is financially constrained or
not. Specifically, we rank firms according to their firm size represented by book value
of their total assets, and divide them into three groups, i.e., the smallest, medium and
largest group. Firms that lie in the lowest one third of firm size and decreased dividend
per share during the past year are classified as constrained. In a similar way, firms that
fall into the highest one third and increased dividend per share during the past year are
classified as unconstrained. This categorization is based on the following two reasons.
Firstly, large firms are easier to raise fund from external financing, because they have
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more collateral to apply for loans and less prone to go bankruptcy. Secondly, increased
dividend per share of a firm indicates that the firm’s cash flow is at least not bad, or
else it will retain cash flow for investments and other expenses.
(2) We use four financial variables to comprehensively reflect financial performance of
each firm. Specifically, These four variables are indicators of leverage, profitable
investment opportunities, profitability of assets and liquidity, which are represented
by long-term debt ratio (Debt), price-to-book ratio (PTBV), return on assets (ROA),
and current ratio (Current). Definitions of variables are as follows,
Debt =
long-term debt
Book value of total assets
PTBV = Price-to-book value =
Market price per share
Book value per share
ROA = Return on asset =
Net income+Interest Expense-Interest tax savings
Average total assets
Current =
Current assets
Current liabilities
The choice of these four financial variables is not at random. Firstly, each variable
is commonly interpreted as an indicator of certain aspect of a firm’s financial perfor-
mance, and they together describe the whole picture of the firm. Secondly, we also
tried other indicators to represent the four aspects of a firm’s financial performance,
but they are outweighed by the above financial variables in the sense of regression
fitness.
(3) We use a Probit model to construct financial constraint index,
Prob(Y = 1|X) =
∫ X′β
−∞
φ(t)dt = Φ(X ′β) (4.1)
As Φ(X ′β) is a strictly increasing function with respect to X ′β, we define financial
constraint index (FT) as,
FTit = constant + β1Debtit + β2PTBVit + β3ROAit + β4Currentit , (4.2)
where i denotes firm i and t refers to year t.
We repeat to construct financially constrained and unconstrained portfolios year by
year by utilizing annual financial data, and categorize firms whose FT index falls into
the largest one third as financially constrained, and firms whose financial index falls
into the lowest one third as financially unconstrained, with the middle one third being
deleted.
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In order to capture financial performance of each company comprehensively, the
above four financial variables should be of equal importance in constructing FT in-
dex. In practice, we delete those firms which have extreme value of the four variables
because variables with extreme value will dominate others when combined to con-
struct FT index. Specifically, we delete those firms that have any of the four variables
smaller than corresponding 1 centile or larger than 99 centile.
4.2 Data and classification results
We use all A-share stocks listed at Shanghai and Shenzhen exchange as research sample.
The time ranges from year 2002 to 2008, during which frequent monetary policies were
announced and enough research sample in classified groups exists. We approximate risk-
free interest rate by return of one-year central bank bill, which is neither too volatile to be
interpreted as risk-free nor almost fixed and controlled by government. Market return is
represented by return on A-share stock market index. Data sets of risk-free interest rate,
market return and Fama-French three factors are all from Resset Database. The other data
including prices of A-share stocks and annual financial variables are all from Datastream.
Table 1 shows sample size in each year from 2002 to 2008 except 2005, because there
was no policy announcement in 2005. Effective firms refer to those firms that do not have
missing value in DPS, firm size, Debt, PTBV, ROA and Current, and whose values of the lat-
ter four variables do not lie in the largest or lowest 1 centile. Constrained denotes firms that
have firm size in the lowest one third and decreased DPS in the past year, and unconstrained
refers to firms that have firm size in the highest one third and increased DPS in the past year.
We call such categorization original groups in remaining part. We find that composition and
proportion of financially constrained and unconstrained portfolio vary from year to year,
which in all takes about 1/6 to 1/5 of effective samples. As can be seen, most of policy
changes happened in 2007 and 2008, when stock market reached peak and then experienced
drastic declination because of financial crisis.
Table 2 presents probit regressions to construct financial constraint index. As can be
seen, the selected four financial variables do well in summarizing financial status of a firm
since most of the coefficients are statistically significant, and their signs and magnitude are
relatively stable over years except Debt in 2007. FT is weighted sum of financial variables
with weight being corresponding coefficients. We classify 50 firms in effective sample with
the lowest FT index as unconstrained and 50 firms with the highest FT as constrained. We
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can find that constrained firms have significant lower historical returns on assets but brighter
growth opportunities implied by higher price-to-book value. This is the same as our expec-
tation. When firms have less retained earnings resulted from lower return on assets, they
rely more on external financing to fund investment and tend to be more constrained. Con-
strained firms also have higher current ratio, which means that they keep more current assets
on balance sheet to handle liquidity needs. For the composition of debts, there is evidence
that unconstrained firms are able to raise more long-term debts to finance investment and
other expenses. Pseudo-R2 is McFadden’s goodness-of-fit measure, which is an analog of
R2 in linear regression. Pseudo-R2 is defined as
Pseudo-R2 = 1− lnL
lnL0
, (4.3)
where lnL0 is log-likelihood of constrained model, and lnL is that of unconstrained model.
The larger the Pseudo-R2, the better the goodness-of-fit. All probit regressions have reason-
able magnitude. We also use LR test statistic to test for joint hypothesis that all coefficients
in probit model are not significant, which is rejected at 99.9% confidence level.
We provide summary statistics for financial variables in financially constrained and un-
constrained portfolios. Table 3 presents means of variables in original groups. Constrained
firms have smaller average of DPS and total assets than unconstrained firms, which is deter-
mined by our categorization scheme. Constrained firms also have lower values in returns on
assets and higher price-to-book value, which supports our finding in probit regression. For
long-term debt ratio and current ratio, they reveal the same fact as in table 2.
Table 4 shows summary statistics of financial variables in classified portfolios. We clas-
sify 50 firms with the highest FT index as constrained and 50 ones with lowest FT index
as unconstrained. As unconstrained firms have systematically higher DPS and firm size,
the other four financial variables succeed in predicting the two indicators used to categorize
original groups. The difference in debt, ROA, price-to-book value between constrained and
unconstrained portfolios have the same characteristics as in original groups, which verifies
soundness of our classification method.
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Table 4.1 Number of Effective Firms in Original Groups from 2002
to 2008 (except 2005)
Year 2002 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008
Constrained 50 115 65 52 52 49
Unconstrained 157 99 100 137 120 172
Effective number of firms 982 1053 1100 1219 1221 1297
Number of policy changes 1 1 2 5 15 10
Original groups denote groups that we construct according to DPS and firm size.
Constrained refers to firms that have firm size in the lowest one third of all firms and
decreased dividend per share in the past year, while unconstrained stands for firms
that have firm size in the largest one third of all firms and increased dividend per
share in the past year.
Table 4.2 Classification by Probit Model from Year 2002 to Year 2008 (ex-
cept 2005)
Year 2002 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008
Constant -1.63*** -1.58*** -.80* -.92*** -.08 -.99***
Debt -2.11 -2.64* -4.82** -3.25** -12.54*** -5.66***
PTBV .18*** .50*** .45*** .37*** .13 .14***
ROA -.12*** -.16*** -.31*** -.13*** -.17*** -.09***
Current .33** .20 .55*** .24*** .51*** .44***
LR statistic 72.74 122.76 92.84 48.79 72.37 51.29
Pseudo-R2 0.32 0.42 0.42 0.22 0.34 0.22
FT (con.) .2184 1.5208 .9466 -.0347 .1877 -.2987
FT (uncon.) -1.1838 -.7403 -1.2789 -.9707 -1.5312 -1.2079
*, ** and *** mean that parameters are significantly different from 0 at 90%, 95% and 99%
level correspondingly. LR statistic follows χ2(4) distribution, with critical value at 99% being
18.4668.
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Table 4.3 Variable Means of Original Groups
Year 2002 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008
Total Assets(con) 605972.6 703037.5 757141.9 734876.1 769992.3 807044.3
Total Assets(uncon) 4277884 9085227 7919918 1.24e+07 1.44e+07 1.88e+07
DPS(con) .0404 .0276 .0234 .0223 .0329 .0239
DPS(uncon) .1755 .1044 .1256 .1474 .1699 .1861
Current(con) 1.82 1.48 1.76 1.84 1.71 1.58
Current(uncon) 1.52 1.54 1.33 1.31 1.22 1.22
Debt(con) 4.36 3.74 3.83 3.47 1.61 3.02
Debt(uncon) 7.97 7.64 9.51 9.49 9.06 9.72
ROA(con) 2.61 .53 2.77 2.81 3.87 5.16
ROA(uncon) 5.46 5.72 6.60 6.17 6.95 8.45
PTBV(con) 9.36 6.03 4.04 2.47 2.10 4.52
PTBV(uncon) 4.38 3.31 2.84 1.99 2.03 3.97
Debt and ROA are in percentiles, unit of Total Assets is thousand Chinese Yuan, and unit of DPS is Chinese
Yuan. Original groups denote groups that we construct according to DPS and firm size. Constrained refers to
firms that have firm size in the lowest one third of all firms and decreased dividend per share in the past year,
while unconstrained stands for firms that have firm size in the largest one third of all firms and increased
dividend per share in the past year.
Table 4.4 Variable Means of Classified Groups
Year 2002 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008
Total Assets(con) 1004487 631895.9 1090277 997829.9 1303674 1818864
Total Assets(uncon) 5632426 1.56e+07 8322659 2.27e+07 1.41e+07 1.84e+07
DPS(con) .0552 .0238 .0594 .0084 .0088 .0146
DPS(uncon) .0854 .0838 .0976 .1106 .1066 .0922
Current(con) 1.04 .78 .87 .85 1.71 1.97
Current(uncon) 1.14 1.27 1.15 .84 .95 .63
Debt(con) 1.71 2.84 2.83 1.37 1.32 0.92
Debt(uncon) 11.96 15.99 16.91 2.27 3.21 22.54
ROA(con) -8.67 -13.19 -12.65 -18.81 -12.52 -3.07
ROA(uncon) 8.89 7.36 10.13 6.97 6.40 11.95
PTBV(con) 18.63 16.00 10.03 6.73 4.02 15.16
PTBV(uncon) 3.58 2.31 2.11 .44 1.81 1.33
Debt and ROA are in percentiles, unit of Total Assets is thousand Chinese Yuan, and unit of DPS is Chinese
Yuan. Classified groups refers to groups constructed by financial constraint index. Constrained (con) stands
for 50 firms whose FT index are the largest among effective firms, while unconstrained (uncon) are 50 firms
whose FT index are the lowest among effective firms.
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5 Empirical Results
5.1 The impact of monetary policy announcements on stock market
This part presents empirical findings of the impact of monetary policy announcements
on stock returns. We delete stocks that have less than 80 observations in each estimation
window or less than 4 observations in each event window, which aims to avoid the prob-
lem of thinly trading. Table 5 explains reactions of constrained firms and unconstrained to
monetary policy announcements. Part A uses the market model to capture abnormal returns,
and Part B uses the Fama-French three-factor model. Part A shows that stock market has
already anticipated both expanding and deflationary policy news before announcement. Ex-
panding monetary policies make more stocks obtain positive abnormal returns on the trading
day prior to announcement, and deflationary monetary policies induce more stocks to suffer
from negative abnormal returns. It is also obvious that stocks almost have no response on
days of announcement. These evidence implies that contents of announcements have been
leaked to market participants so that monetary policy announcements can not bring strong
shock to the market when they are released. When we apply Fama-French model to mea-
sure abnormal returns in Part B, similar information leakage is found. The main difference
between A and B is that there is some reaction on days of announcement in Part B when
monetary policy is expanding. Table 6 applies the same method as Table 5 to classified
groups. The finding is quite different from that of original groups, with less obvious evi-
dence of response before announcement. The common findings of Table 5 and table 6 are
that financially constrained and unconstrained firms react quite similar to monetary policy
shocks, which implies that the credit channel of monetary policies does not exist in the
short run. This result is different from Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004), which found that fi-
nancially constrained and unconstrained firms respond differently to monetary policy in the
U.S. market. One possible reason is that even monetary policy changes affect the amount
and cost of credit available to firms, they may only work in the medium and long term and
it takes time for distinction between financially constrained and unconstrained firms to be
reflected.
Table 7 examines deflationary announcements of reserve ratio changes and loan rate
changes separately to original groups. We find that there is no announcement effect for
loan rate changes. In contrast, stock market reacts to reserve ratio changes on days of
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announcement. Another finding is that there is no evidence of pre-announcement effects
when we separate announcements into reserve ratio changes and interest rate changes. Table
8 applies the same method as table 7 to classified groups. It is the same that stocks do not
respond to interest rate changes, and there are also pre-announcement effects and some
reactions after announcement.
In summary, there are three facts worth emphasizing. Firstly, as shown in Table 5 and 6,
the stock market responds before news of monetary policy changes is publicly known, which
is quite surprising, because unlike monetary policy practice in U.S., there is no fixed sched-
ule for PBC to hold routing meetings or make announcement of monetary policy but market
participants still anticipate policy changes and adjusts preceding announcement. Secondly,
reserve ratio changes impose much stronger influence on the stock market while there is al-
most no effect caused by loan interest rate changes. One possible reason is that PBC usually
adjust market interest rate gradually, and therefore market participants can infer potential
policy actions from market movement and factor the information in stock prices before
news release. Thirdly, as reserve ratio changes suddenly affect balance sheet of banks and
monetary multiplier, this blunt instrument has already been abandoned by central banks of
most developed economies. However, PBC prefers reserve ratio instrument since it can rein
in and inject liquidity to market in a short period, and this instrument was frequently used
in 2006 to 2008 to reduce excessive liquidity brought by expanding trade surplus.
5.2 A special case: monetary policy effects on property industry
We study stocks in property industry on purpose in this part, because property firms in
China rely heavily on bank loans and therefore are more sensitive to adjustment of mone-
tary policy. As indicated in previous research, there is significant pre-announcement effect
for both expanding and deflationary monetary policies. And it can be seen from Table 9,
property stocks react to deflationary announcements on days of announcement. When we
examine the impact of interest rate changes and reserve ratio changes separately, we find
property stocks respond more strongly to interest rate changes. Table 8 presents the effects
of two recent announcements in 2010. For the first increase of reserve ratio in 2010, much
more stocks react negatively prior to announcement, while stocks remain relatively calm
before the second change in reserve ratio. This is because the first reserve ratio change
happened after a series of expanding monetary policies in 2008 and there was no monetary
policy announcement in 2009. This announcement signals a directional change in monetary
policy path, and the market expectation that stimulating policies during financial crisis will
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Table 5.1 Abnormal returns caused by monetary policies (Original
groups)
Part A: Market Model
Portfolio Financially Constrained Financially Unconstrained
Policy Expanding Deflationary Expanding Deflationary
Event day pˆ = 0.481 pˆ = 0.535 pˆ = 0.487 pˆ = 0.546
-2 0.487 0.494 0.525** 0.523
-1 0.558** 0.573*** 0.555*** 0.570***
0 0.451 0.492 0.496 0.524
1 0.544** 0.530 0.463 0.522
2 0.473 0.492 0.447 0.533
Part B: Fama-French
Portfolio Financially Constrained Financially Unconstrained
Policy Expanding Deflationary Expanding Deflationary
Event day pˆ = 0.449 pˆ = 0.563 pˆ = 0.460 pˆ = 0.555
-2 0.434 0.564 0.513*** 0.562
-1 0.549*** 0.592** 0.543*** 0.589***
0 0.549*** 0.550 0.509*** 0.539
1 0.500 0.589** 0.428 0.539
2 0.416 0.557 0.410 0.552
** and *** denote significance at 95% and 99% level respectively using a one-tail test.
We define original groups as follows. When an announcement of monetary policy hap-
pens, there are both financially constrained and unconstrained firms according to DPS
and firm size. We combine all constrained and unconstrained firms across events that
are expanding or deflationary.
end brings stronger reaction before news release.
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Table 5.2 Abnormal returns caused by monetary policies (Classified
groups)
Part A: Market Model
Portfolio Financially Constrained Financially Unconstrained
Policy Expanding Deflationary Expanding Deflationary
Event day pˆ = 0.485 pˆ = 0.526 pˆ = 0.486 pˆ = 0.547
-2 0.485 0.512 0.547** 0.504
-1 0.515 0.541 0.580*** 0.563
0 0.464 0.474 0.497 0.505
1 0.515 0.506 0.486 0.542
2 0.387 0.453 0.459 0.516
Part B: Fama-French
Portfolio Financially Constrained Financially Unconstrained
Policy Expanding Deflationary Expanding Deflationary
Event day pˆ = 0.435 pˆ = 0.562 pˆ = 0.452 pˆ = 0.552
-2 0.387 0.593** 0.541*** 0.541
-1 0.459 0.574 0.575*** 0.567
0 0.541*** 0.529 0.497 0.503
1 0.500 0.584 0.492 0.560
2 0.309 0.511 0.436 0.537
** and *** denote significance at 95% and 99% level using a one-tail test. We define
classified groups as follows. When an announcement of monetary policy happens, there
are both financially constrained and unconstrained firms according to rank of FT index.
We combine all constrained and unconstrained firms across events that are expanding or
deflationary.
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Table 5.3 Comparison of effects from interest rate changes and reserve ratio
changes (Original groups)
Part A: Market Model
Portfolio Financially Constrained Financially Unconstrained
Instrument Reserve ration Interest rate Reserve ration Interest rate
Event day pˆ = 0.475 pˆ = 0.472 pˆ = 0.453 pˆ = 0.457
-2 0.483 0.512 0.498*** 0.480
-1 0.479 0.405 0.463 0.401
0 0.537*** 0.464 0.523*** 0.423
1 0.492 0.506 0.450 0.459
2 0.535*** 0.583*** 0.486** 0.462
Part B: Fama-French
Portfolio Financially Constrained Financially Unconstrained
Instrument Reserve ration Interest rate Reserve ration Interest rate
Event day pˆ = 0.438 pˆ = 0.438 pˆ = 0.449 pˆ = 0.447
-2 0.400 0.429 0.444 0.477
-1 0.421 0.440 0.445 0.419
0 0.477** 0.429 0.519*** 0.448
1 0.421 0.405 0.434 0.444
2 0.506*** 0.440 0.469 0.448
** and *** denote significance at 95% and 99% level using a one-tail test. We define original
groups as follows. When an announcement of monetary policy happens, there are both finan-
cially constrained and unconstrained firms according to DPS and firm size. We combine all
constrained and unconstrained firms across events that are caused by reserve ratio or loan rate
changes.
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Table 5.4 Comparison of effects from interest rate changes and reserve ratio
changes (Classified groups)
Part A: Market Model
Portfolio Financially Constrained Financially Unconstrained
Instrument Reserve ration Interest rate Reserve ration Interest rate
Event day pˆ = 0.465 pˆ = 0.465 pˆ = 0.455 pˆ = 0.451
-2 0.505** 0.495 0.484*** 0.454
-1 0.461 0.354 0.449 0.375
0 0.521*** 0.471 0.595*** 0.413
1 0.454 0.495 0.486*** 0.453
2 0.524*** 0.471 0.477** 0.429
Part B: Fama-French
Portfolio Financially Constrained Financially Unconstrained
Instrument Reserve ration Interest rate Reserve ration Interest rate
Event day pˆ = 0.439 pˆ = 0.434 pˆ = 0.447 pˆ = 0.441
-2 0.434 0.438 0.439 0.429
-1 0.424 0.377 0.424 0.375
0 0.456 0.438 0.482*** 0.398
1 0.415 0.387 0.479*** 0.416
2 0.468 0.387 0.467** 0.390
** and *** denote significance at 95% and 99% level respectively using a one-tail test. We define
classified groups as follows. When an announcement of monetary policy happens, there are both
financially constrained and unconstrained firms according to rank of FT index. We combine all
constrained and unconstrained firms across events that are expanding or deflationary.
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Table 5.5 Effects from monetary policies on property industry (2002-2008)
Part A: Effects from expanding and deflationary monetary policies
Model Market model Fama-French
Policy Expanding Deflationary Expanding Deflationary
Event day pˆ = 0.481 pˆ = 0.535 pˆ = 0.450 pˆ = 0.549
-2 0.451 0.568*** 0.437 0.601***
-1 0.518** 0.566*** 0.526*** 0.582***
0 0.516 0.567*** 0.545*** 0.598***
1 0.354 0.500 0.316 0.523
2 0.431 0.507 0.385 0.522
Part B: Comparison of deflationary reserve ratio and loan rate changes
Model Market model Fama-French
Instrument Reserve ration Interest rate Reserve ration Interest rate
Event day pˆ = 0.466 pˆ = 0.535 pˆ = 0.453 pˆ = 0.550
-2 0.504** 0.610*** 0.499** 0.654***
-1 0.465 0.587*** 0.472 0.615***
0 0.337 0.541 0.332 0.581**
1 0.499 0.509 0.458 0.523
2 0.462 0.499 0.414 0.501
** denotes significance at 95% level, using a one-tail test
*** denotes significance at 99% level, using a one-tail test
We do not consider policy changes in 2010, because we want to compare the property industry
with average market during the same period.
Table 5.6 Influence of recent two reserve ratio changes on stocks in property in-
dustry (2010)
Reserve ratio increased on 12/01/2010
Event day day -2 day -1 day 0 day 1 day 2
Market model (pˆ = 0.5702) 0.9167*** 0.7037*** 0.5741 0.5741 0.1482
Fama-French (pˆ = 0.5450) 0.8704*** 0.7222*** 0.4352 0.6574 0.1204
Reserve ratio increased on 12/02/2010
Event day day -2 day -1 day 0 day 1 day 2
Market model (pˆ = 0.5745) 0.2887 0.5876 0.7217*** 0.6495 0.4021
Fama-French (pˆ = 0.5438) 0.4742 0.6701*** 0.5773 0.3608 0.4124
** denotes significance at 95% level, using a one-tail test
*** denotes significance at 99% level, using a one-tail test
We choose these two announcements as special cases since there is no announcement on either reserve
ratio or loan interest rate in 2009 and the two announcements are after global financial crisis.
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6 Conclusion
Research on the impact of monetary policy announcements on stock market can not only
improve our understanding of how monetary policies transmit in short term, but also enables
us to investigate market expectation and information content of monetary policy changes.
In contrast with event-study regression of Bernanke and Kuttner [2005], we employ a non-
parametric event-study methodology in finance literature to study announcement effects on
stock market.
In order to compare reactions of stocks with varying characteristics, we construct a
financial constraint index to classify firms into financially constrained and unconstrained
portfolios. We arrive at the conclusion that there is no significant difference in reaction of
constrained and unconstrained stocks, which suggests that the credit transmission channel
of monetary policies does not exist in short term.
We investigate information leakage of monetary policies through generalized sign test.
Generally, we find that more stocks gain positive abnormal returns before announcement of
expanding policies and suffer losses before release of deflationary policies. The existence of
reactions preceding announcement implies information leakage of monetary policy changes.
When we examine reserve ratio and loan rate changes separately, we find that stock returns
react more strongly prior to reserve ratio changes, which suggests the power of reserve ratio
as a monetary policy instrument. We treat property stocks as a special case, and find that
they respond more drastically than the average stock market, which can be supported by the
existence of response both before and on days of announcement. In the two recent changes
of reserve ratio in 2010, property stocks react more before the first policy change, which
may indicate a directional change of monetary policy path.
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7 Appendix: Time table of monetary policy announcements
Table 7.1 Time table of policy changes
Event day Reserve ratio One-year loan rate
02/25/2002 from 5.85% to 5.31%
08/25/2003 from 6% to 7%
04/12/2004 from 7% to 7.5%
10/29/2004 from 5.31% to 5.58%
04/28/2006 from 5.58% to 5.85%
06/19/2006 from 7.5% to 8%
07/24/2006 from 8% to 8.5%
08/21/2006 from 5.85% to 6.12%
11/06/2006 from 8.5% to 9%
01/08/2007 from 9% to 9.5%
02/26/2007 from 9.5% to 10%
03/19/2007 from 6.12% to 6.39%
04/06/2007 from 10% to 10.5%
04/30/2007 from 10.5% to 11%
05/21/2007 from 11% to 11.5% from 6.39% to 6.57%
07/23/2007 from 6.57% to 6.84%
07/31/2007 from 11.5% to 12%
08/22/2007 from 6.84% to 7.02%
09/07/2007 from 12% to 12.5%
09/17/2007 from 7.02% to 7.29%
10/15/2007 from 12.5% to 13%
11/12/2007 from 13% to 13.5%
12/10/2007 from 13.5% to 14.5%
12/21/2007 from 7.29% to 7.47%
01/17/2008 from 14.5% to 15%
03/19/2008 from 15% to 15.5%
04/17/2008 from 15.5% to 16%
05/13/2008 from 16% to 16.5%
06/10/2008 16.5% to 17%, then to 17.5%
09/16/2008 from 17.5% to 16.5% from 7.47% to 7.2%
10/09/2008 from 16.5% to 16% from 7.2% to 6.93%
10/30/2008 from 6.93% to 6.66%
11/27/2008 from 16% to 15% from 6.66% to 5.58%
12/23/2008 from 15% to 14.5% from 5.58% to 5.31%
01/13/2010 from 14.5% to 15%
02/22/2010 from 15% to 15.5%
Event day refers to the first trading day after an announcement of policy
change was released. The above information is based on announcements
from People’s Bank of China, refer to www.pbc.gov.cn
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